

**American Political Development
and the Advent of Genuine Intermediary Factions
Within Contemporary Democratic and Republican Parties**

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ABSTRACT

The concept of American political development was developed by William Chambers in 1967 on the cusp of the congressional and party reform eras where all was turned topsy-turvy. His path-breaking work dividing American political development into three eras: nation-building (1789-1815); establishment of significant form (1828-1865); and derivative stage (1865-1967) – at least in terms of political parties – has not been revisited often even as subfield specialists have developed diverse independent historical models based on milestones in party government, congressional development, party systems realignment, presidential nomination eras and party organizations. In this research these competing models are compared based on their ability to explain polarization, institutionalized partisan conflict, and growth of party-like genuine factions (opposed to tendencies or “in” and “out” party factional voting blocs). This research demonstrates that contemporary factions are new - party-like in their locus in durable social formations and genuine intermediation, and provides a data-driven reassessment of political development based on Democratic and Republican convention delegates surveys (1980-2004 (Party Elite Study), and participant-observation of the national nominating conventions conducted by the authors.

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Nearly 50 years after the 1960s social movements and the subsequent 1970s political party and congressional reforms, American political parties remain substantially misunderstood. Amid ongoing controversies over the way we study political parties, for example, critiques of the “convention problem,” questions regarding and reactions against the growth of party polarization, or the “culture wars” at the mass and elite level and what some have termed “fight club” politics in Congress (Eilperin, 2006), debates over whether there remains any “party-in-the-electorate,” and rhapsodies over recent developments regarding how parties use new technologies to campaign more effectively, as a discipline, political science still lacks agreement on a theory of American political party development that links together early models of the party to contemporary party development, and one that provides potential insights to other political party systems. This paper reviews existing theoretical models of American political party development and develops and tests what we call a “party-centric” model based on the theory of party institutionalization using mixed methods. Our goal is to elucidate a theory of party organizational change that provides a testable model of contemporary parties.

Our methodology includes over-time survey research based upon the Party Elite Study and over-time participant observation by the authors at the national conventions, state and local parties, and of congressional parties. We argue that (1) a party-centric and organizationally rich conceptualization of party institutionalization provides the most theoretically satisfying model of party development; (2) party factions are the basic building block of party organizations; (3) examining factions over time can provide unique insights into the internal structure of parties; and (4) that political party conventions are a unique window into the composition of party organizations and how they function organizationally in American politics. We turn first to a review of American political – and political party – development literature before elucidating our party-centric model and providing empirical tests of our hypotheses about contemporary parties using data from the Party Elite Study.

The Grand Question: Why Parties – OR – How Do Parties Develop and Change Organizationally?

Competing frameworks in American political development comprise a dense thicket, including grand theories as well as mid-level theories. Grand theories are not directly testable because they have competing assumptions and use of different methodologies reliant upon different readings of epistemology and ontology. Indeed, the concept of institutionalization – once ignored by behavioralists, but now adopted by rational choice theorists as well as organizational theorists (like party-centric theory) and historical institutionalists – is increasingly a contested concept (Gallie 1956) precisely for this reason.

Grand theories address different facets of development than those addressed here. For example, rational choice theorist John Aldrich (1995; see also Schlesinger 1984, 1994) asks the question of “why parties?” from a theoretical perspective. Aldrich, for example, rejects the need to provide “a complete narrative of party history” in his identification of a single party structure – the mass party – existing from the 1860s to the 1960s (1995:159). Instead, he focuses on the incentives of office holders and the balance of selective versus collective incentives and what this portends for possible party structures. Another grand theory is that of American Political Development (or ‘APD’), a new subfield in political science delineated by a specific methodology known as historical institutionalism¹. Following William Chambers’ origination of the concept of American political development in 1967, APD scholars focus on nation and state-building. Chambers, for example, divided American political development into three eras: nation-building (1789-1815); establishment of significant form (1828-1865); and derivative stage (1865-1967). Current APD scholars (Plotke 1996; Valelly 2003; Polsky 1997; Skowronek 1993) argue that American parties lack enough coherence to study as organizations; instead, APD scholars study dominant governing “regimes” that may be tied to a specific party, but exist independently.²

¹ Stephen Skowronek and Karen Orren, of the University of California at Los Angeles, founded the subfield’s flagship journal, *Studies in American Political Development*, in 1985

² David Plotke, for example, argues that “a study of political change in the United States cannot be a party study per se, even if it is reasonable to name political orders by their leading party” or leader (1996: 39). As Rick Valelly put it, regimes may have a “carrier” party (2004), but parties themselves are not studied as separate entities, but instead, they are interpreted as a part of a larger political order or “regime” such as the New Deal. Regimes may overlap and consist of “durable partisan governing apparatus” comprised of a unifying intellectual narrative, a durable alliance of political interests, and the insinuation of supporters into state institutions (executive, judicial and congressional) (Polsky 1997:153). Stephen Skowronek (1993), for example, describes five regimes (Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt, and Ronald Reagan) which, except for the last, parallel critical realignment periods.

The Mid-Range Theories: Competing Frameworks in American Political Development

By contrast, empirical frameworks of political party development are testable. There are five major extant empirical frameworks of American party development: political development of party organizations, party realignment, nomination methods for presidents, development of congressional party centers, and significant events in party government. These are described below and compared chronologically in Figure 1 (**Figure 1 about here**). What is noteworthy is that each framework has converged on the same point: that party organizations matter more today than heretofore.

Political Development of American Parties. The political development of party organizations can be identified from a variety of authors who have described a specific party type. From James Sterling Young's (1966) examination of proto-parties in the U.S. Congress based upon boarding house cliques to the cadre organization innovated by Andrew Jackson in the 1830s to the party machines developing after the Civil War (Epstein, 1986; Crotty, 1986; Brown and Halaby, 1987), the State Utility Party in the early 1900s (Epstein, 1986) and Institutionalized parties developing after 1974 (Baer, 1993), we have seen a dramatic change in party organizational differentiation and penetration or rootedness.

What has been little recognized in the general party literature is that each of these organizational types formed and consolidated during distinct periods of American history, and they have provided different routes for inclusion of new groups. Party machines were based on patronage and resources to insider groups (Crotty, 1986; Brown and Halaby, 1987). By contrast the State Utility Party with restrictions on the entry of new groups froze existing political alignments – a logjam only broken by protests and party reform in the transitional era – resulting in institutionalized parties of today (Baer and Bositis, 1988; Baer, 1993). The institutionalized parties changed the nature of party competition and also altered the nature of leadership now based on elite level “networks” rather than “powerbrokers.” Interests within a party must actually mobilize their members to be effective in the reformed process and leaders will be limited if “they lack authentic membership support” (Dark, 1996:520). Contemporary features of institutionalized parties include: an increased community life, stable factions with organized entities, increased norms and internal rules, increased organizational interdependence, and increased organizational vitality. As a result, the leadership becomes more heterogeneous across parties and more homogeneous within parties, and the two-party coalitions become more distinct demographically and ideologically. In an era where parties are more dominant, the

party organizational framework provides considerable theoretical purchase both in explaining change and the internal web of party as well as intermediation (Baer and Dolan 1994).

Realignment. Another key framework focuses on party systems based upon critical elections and realignment with third parties as primary agents of change (Key, 1955; Burnham 1971; Sundquist, 1983). Typically, most treatments identify three pre-party systems, and four major party systems where groups switch party affiliation in a critical election around new issues during periods of significant third party activity and usually switches in majority party status. What has happened in the decades following the 1932 realignment remains in scholarly dispute (Hershey 2009:129-36). Many argue that realignment just does not work in the same way (Shafer 1991), while others now dispute the entire idea of patterns in voting behavior (Mayhew 2002). Others have proposed different scenarios ranging from an aborted Republican realignment in 1968, or a short-lived one in 1994, to a period of dealignment to assessments that the day of realignment has been replaced by issue evolution (Carmines and Stimson, 1989) or institutionalized parties (Baer, 1993). The fact that there has not appeared a secure majority party or that internal social movements and external independent candidates rather than genuine third parties are increasingly key actors confounds the focus on party systems *per se*. As David Plotke concludes, “the realignment view ascribes political change and development to extrapolitical forces and downplays the causal role of political conflict” (1996: 37-38). The failure of the realignment framework to explain contemporary political change has been challenged as out-of-touch. Layman and Carsey, for example, argue that “the last three decades....have been characterized not by conflict displacement, as the conventional wisdom in the realignment literature would predict, but by conflict extension” and polarization (2002:227).

Presidential Nomination Systems. Nomination frameworks structure the role of the party grassroots and campaign strategies (Crotty and Jackson, 1985; Jackson and Crotty, 2000). As the parties, and especially the national parties, became relatively more institutionalized, they have developed “rootedness” in different ways. The changing role of the presidential primaries has been particularly important. In the first primaries era, i.e. starting in the early 1900s, the presidential primaries appeared but were not terribly important. The grafting of a small number of boutique presidential primaries in the early 1900s onto the existing convention system meant that candidates could use a state primary win to demonstrate popular support prior to the convention itself. While this added an element of public plebiscites, primaries served in an advisory role and did not fundamentally alter the basic

convention processes and the conventions remained the central decision making bodies for selecting the presidential nominees. After the 1968-72 party reforms, most states adopted primaries and the primary method for selecting delegates became dominant along with increased head-to-head candidate competition and increased voter participation in presidential nominations. While the growth in importance of primaries and caucuses does demarcate the current era, this does not mean that convention delegates are unimportant, or that electoral engineering alone has produced the current system. In fact, the post-1968 transformation of conventions (which occurred as part of demands for a more participatory process (Baer and Bositis, 1988) has extended their intermediary role within the nominating process itself in ways that have involved more and more party supporters in a more and more participatory process. The increasing frontloading of the primary schedule into an earlier and more compressed primary schedule began in 1988 with the Super-Tuesday primaries, but has occurred due to a different set of dynamics – the efforts of party leaders and frontrunner candidates to shorten the process, and the “leap-frogging” efforts of states to gain campaign and media attention through holding early primaries.

Development of Congressional Power Centers. Another consideration is the relative balance of presidential and congressional power. The struggle for dominance between the two branches has waxed and waned throughout American history, but the general tendency has been toward the enhancement of presidential power usually at the expense of the legislature. Milestones in the development of congressional power centers circumscribe the process by which the “legislative state of nature” (Cox, 2005) and the dominance of “a coalition of voting blocs” (Lowi, 1985:202) is replaced by party organization, cohesion and leadership. How parties are constructed can result in greater presidentialization or in congressional power. There had been brief periods of domination by one branch: both presidential influence (Jeffersonian fusion (1800-1808), Wilson’s “perfected” party government (1913-1916)) and congressional influence (Reconstruction (1867-1877), Strong Speaker Era (1890-1910) and the Conservative Coalition (1937-1969)). While few political scientists analyze parties in this way, understanding the chronological relationship of these milestones with the other frameworks is useful.

Significant Events in Party Government. Among those studying congressional parties, there are also identifiable milestones in party (or party-centric) government: first, the development of a set of norms of responsible opposition in the years following the Civil War, a rewriting of U.S. House rules to organized around political parties in the 1890s, the writing of Democratic and Republican party rules in the early 1900s, the development and

institutionalization of committees through several stages culminating in the Committee Baron Era, followed by House internal reforms within the Democrats from 1969 to the 1970s which empowered party leaders, and later by the Republicans in the 1980s, whose reforms in the 1980s and 1990s took a similar course. In the Congressional Reorganization Era (1969-80), this strengthened Congress as an institution itself, with the establishment of a centralized budget process, new budget staff support, rules which placed the “traffic cop” House Rules Committee under strict party control, and a new process of omnibus bills which placed a premium on coordination. The result was a genuine American species of party government. Prior to these reforms, House floor votes were not party votes, but an informal cross-party coalition – the “Conservative Coalition” – (Patterson, 1966) comprised of conservative Democrats and northern Republicans reduced the Democratic numerical majority to a paper majority. The reform process created by the 1980s what David Rohde (1991) has called “conditional party government” and what Leroy Rieselbach (1977) terms majoritarian democracy. Prior to the 1970s reforms, institutional conflict between Congress and the President comprised coalition government rather than party government. Coalition government was dominated by what has been variously called “interest group liberalism” (Lowi, 1969) and “institutionalized pluralism” (Kernell, 2007:11; 1986). Prior to the development of “conditional party government,” as James Sundquist put it, “the party position in Congress” was “either the president’s program or none at all” (1980:199). As a result, in the contemporary era, we now see partisan institutionalized conflict between Congress and the President. While Mayhew (1974:27) had deprecated parties as potential units of analysis within Congress, institutional reforms have produced partisan ideological polarization (Taylor, 1996) and conflict expansion (Layman and Carsey, 2002).

Polarization and the Contemporary Era. Except for the party realignment framework, the end stage of each framework has now converged: Congress, party organizations, and the party grassroots all display greater mobilization, ideological polarization and partisanship. While there may be continued theoretical value in maintaining each of these mid-range theories as a separate framework, there is also value in examining these changes from the integrative perspective of the party organizations, particularly with the current state of institutionalized parties with fully-developed internal party factions, heightened linkages between the presidential and congressional wings, and expanded participation of the interest groups which compose the party coalitions and the party grassroots. And it is conventions that can provide the connecting glue in this analysis. Because of the growing role of parties and

partisanship over time, it is surprising that party organizational development framework has not received greater note. As Theodore Lowi noted, “if party organizations returned to the center of presidential selection, they would build down the presidency by making collective responsibility a natural outcome of the selection process rather than an alien intruder” (1985:211).

Factional Conflict and Stages of Political Development in American Parties

If, as argued above, the party organizational framework provides greater theoretical purchase, this framework should also demarcate other changes in parties such as political conflict and factions. Here, we examine the growth of factions, provide an historical comparison of factional conflicts and the changing functions of conventions within the overall campaign process before turning to the Party Elite Data.

Factions as a Building Block for Political Parties. Factions in political parties have been studied using a diverse array of definitions ranging from tendency to faction. In the U.S., factions have been treated as a deficient party-like substitute (Key, 1950). Tendencies are developed around candidates (“electoral tendencies”) or temporary ideological wings of the party (“ideological tendencies”) (Baer and Dolan, 1994; Baer and Bositis, 1988; Goldman, 1991; Beller and Belloni, 1978; Roback and James, 1978; Zariski, 1960). In earlier eras, tendencies existed in conventions and – depending on party bosses – drove party conflict. Even the progressive movement had difficulty organizing itself as a genuine faction in the Democratic and Republican parties in the early 1900s (Reiter, 1998). Labor, which exercised an effective veto under the dictates of the AFL-CIO on Democratic nominees in the days of brokered conventions, sundered in the party reform era as liberal unions increasingly saw the AFL-CIO as unrepresentative and has now refashioned itself as an effective Democratic Party faction (Dark, 1996; Francia, 2006). Similarly, the “black and tan” party movements within and external to the Republican and Democratic parties prior to 1972 have been replaced by a strategy of black delegates and intra-party factional clout (Hanes and Gray, 1975). The Christian Right, after having established a national organization based on the delegate list from the 1988 candidacy of Pat Roberts, developed a grassroots base adequate enough to gain control of an estimated 18 state Republican parties and had influence in another 13 parties in the early 1990s (Oldfield, 1996: 83). The evangelical Christian groups have continued to be a major component of the Republican coalition even though some individual evangelicals supported Obama in 2008.

Today's true factions develop "persistent organizational structures, a certain amount of self-consciousness, an ideological core around which explicit goals can be articulated and pursued, and an internal communications network" and include smaller groups as well as larger ones distinct to each party (Baer and Dolan, 1994:263). Current party conflict is thus centered on networked factions that differ in the two parties, not brokered tendencies. Based in the advent of the 1960s and 1970s social movements, the parties are changed internally (Baer and Bositis 1988, 1993). While in previous party eras, factions could be defined as "a number of leaders and other adherents of a political party who are cooperating with each other for the purpose of controlling or influencing the formal behavior of the party organization as a whole" (David, Moos, and Goldman 1954: 11), we are arguing that today's factions are largely comprised of interest groups who intermeditate in both partisan and interest group arenas before, during and after conventions. Thus, the large body of work on winner support blocs based upon convention votes only misses the boat in terms of being able to identify the true factions of today. Only field research and inquiry among the delegates can obtain these data. A more interesting question is the impact of how factional conflict has changed in different party organizational eras (Reiter, 2004), and whether factional competition was won by a dominant party faction or not. Baer and Dolan (1994) have demonstrated that by 1988, American parties not only have developed true and relatively stable factions, but that these factions provide intermediation and are distinct to each party. They form a good part of what is permanent and stable within the two parties.

Utilizing the method of contrasting party factions developed by Paul David and Ralph Goldman (David and Goldman 1955; David, Moos and Goldman, 1954)), each convention from 1832 to 2008 is compared in **Table 1** on these dimensions. Dominant factional ascendancy can occur through an inner-group coalition, nomination of an heir-apparent, or a renomination of a sitting president or former nominee. Factional conflict can result in an insurgent factional victory or a stalemate. Overall, American presidential nominations show a high level of factional conflict slightly more than 1 out of 3 conventions.

The lowest levels of convention-based factional conflict reflect a bookend phenomena – it is lowest during the early cadre style of organization and the current institutionalized model³. At both historical bookends, the dominant faction was ascendant more than two of three elections. The machine, state utility, and transition eras

³This is consistent with Reiter's (2004) analysis which finds persistent factions in the early and the contemporary era, while in-between the factions were kaleidoscopic (his terms).

show similar levels of factional conflict, with nearly 2 in 5 conventions demonstrating high factional conflict. Yet, as argued previously, each type of party organization provides a very different form that structures how leaders, groups, and factions gain power. The interesting question is why is the level of factional conflict low in the current institutionalized era? Since 1974, the level of high factional conflict had declined to only one in three of party nominations – despite the fact that party conventions and the nominating processes are more open to the party grassroots

The theory of party institutionalization predicts closer party competition as well as differentiated internal political cultures. We advance the hypothesis that the factions are more homogeneous within the two parties and more divided across the parties in the most recent era. As predicted, the major competition has become between rather than within the major national parties. During this period, we see a high level of electoral instability with closely contested elections. For example:

- Three incumbent presidents were defeated in the general election (Carter defeated Ford in 1976; Reagan defeated Carter in 1980; and Clinton defeated Bush 41 in 1992).
- Three presidents were elected with less than a majority of the popular vote: Clinton in 1992 and 1996; Bush in 2000).
- In 2000, the candidate with the lead in the popular vote (Gore) lost the electoral college vote.
- The U.S. Senate changed party control three or four times (depending on how party control is defined).
- The U.S. House changed party control twice.

How has the level of factional conflict within the two parties changed over time? Factional conflict by party is compared in **Table 2**. A separation by party reveals a different pattern. The number of dominant factional victories does not differ by party by more than 10% in all party eras until the transitional era. At that point, Democratic and Republican party trends sharply diverge. Republican Party nominations became increasingly more dominated by a dominant insider faction while the clout of Democratic insider factions declined sharply in the transitional era and remains relatively low.

Given the stakes of losing in a tightly-contested general election, these data mask an expanding internal conflict within each party. While the visible convention focuses on the current election campaign, the invisible convention focuses on partisan agenda setting – on public policy, representation, candidate identification,

emergence, and recruitment, as well as educational and civic education – all of which is increasingly future-oriented. For example, a number of Republican Presidential candidates become competitive by first running losing insurgent campaigns Ronald Reagan first ran in 1968 and then again in 1976 before winning the nomination in 1980; Bush 41 ran in 1980 before being tapped as Reagan's vice presidential candidate; Bob Dole ran in 1988 before garnering the 1996 nomination, and John McCain won the nomination in 2008 after running in 2000). A similar pattern can be found among Democrats. For example, Jimmy Carter had vice presidential aspirations in 1972 before winning the 1976 nomination; Walter Mondale, Carter's 1976 and 1980 VP candidate, while not running himself, was closely associated with Hubert Humphrey's campaign in 1968; Al Gore ran in 1988 before being selected as Bill Clinton's vice presidential nominee. However, the trend is more marked among Republicans since they always nominate the most experienced and widely recognized candidate while the Democrats have occasionally nominated a choice who can be with some justification called an "outsider", e.g. Carter in 1976, Clinton in 1992, and Obama in 2008. And vice presidential picks are advantaged if they had run previously (Sigelman and Wahlback, 1997). John Edwards, for example, ran in 2004 before being selected as nominee John Kerry's 2004 Vice Presidential nominee. Strategic presidential candidates work to achieve an "on-deck" status (Cronin and Genovese, 2004:29) often through prior runs and a prominent convention presence prior to a candidacy as well as through building core support in party factions. And conventions are increasingly an opportunity for prospective candidates to emerge – a nomination subfunction. For example, Kerry spoke at the 1996 convention before his 2004 run and Barack Obama spoke at the 2004 convention before his 2008 nomination. All of these factors make conventions more, not less, important.

The Party-Centric Argument Regarding Factional Change and Conventions

It was not just the advent of television – it was the growth of presidential power, combined with the arrival of air conditioning, and jet travel that began to transform conventions after the 1950s. These changes, joined with 1960s and 1970s party reforms of conventions, congressionally-based reforms and the development of institutionalized parties in 1974, along with increased youth activism, group-based mobilization, and the growth of issue networks that have materially changed the party landscape. Significantly, we do not see these changes as stemming from a decline of partisanship in the mass public – but rather as derived through changes in interest mediation. Thus, we argue that conventions are not just ritualistic, but that they have in fact expanded into other

arenas of the entire party and serve to expand the scope of party-based decisionmaking. Recruitment and winnowing now occur in the year prior to the conventions in joint candidate debates and primaries and caucuses *in events that convention delegates are active participants and indeed leaders in*. The nomination function has not been removed from conventions – instead, it has been extended spatially (*across party strata*) and temporally (*up to six to 12 months or more before the convention*) into the campaign process. The result is a declining “winner support bloc” precisely because the delegates are themselves selected because they campaign for and support potential nominees during and prior to the primary season (Costain, 1980). The governance function has not been excised from the conventions, instead it is now shared with the national committees which are now also strengthened as institutional actors. The platform function is less of a party statement of past accomplishments than it is a forward-looking document providing a view of the nominee’s plans for presidential policymaking. And, as shown in Figure 2 (**Figure 2 about here**), the concept of a brokered convention has now been transformed into what we term a networked convention based on the advent of genuine, grassroots factions within a lasting role in the party organization.

Based on our argument, we hypothesize that we will find evidence of stable party factions within the two major parties that provide intermediation through group representation in party work as reflected in the Party Elite Study Data.

The Party Elite Study.

The Party Elite Study has been conducted using essentially the same research design continuously every presidential election year since 1976. The Party Elite Study was originated by John S. Jackson and his students, of whom Denise Baer was one, and supported at the Department of Political Science at Southern Illinois University Carbondale. More recently, it has been jointly supported by the Paul Simon Public Policy Institute at SIUC, and by the Ray C. Bliss Institute of Applied Politics at the University of Akron, and since 1992 John Green has become its Co-Director along with John Jackson. Each year an official list of the national convention delegates has been obtained from the two national parties and a questionnaire is mailed immediately after each national convention to a systematic random sample of the delegates. The initial mailing has usually included approximately 1000 to 1100

delegate names, and the questionnaires are mailed to their homes. Each year the return rate has been somewhere between forty and fifty percent after one or two follow up waves of questionnaires which is a rate that compares favorably with other mailed questionnaires to political elites. In most years the respondents have been a representative sample of the known characteristics of the universe of convention delegates although in a few instances a weighting scheme had to be adopted to compensate for a low return rate for some prominent demographic group. Ordinarily the same questions have been utilized in order to enhance the longitudinal comparisons although in some years the meanings of the words, or the labels used for certain concepts, or the issues have changed and items had to be adjusted. While the emphasis has been on continuity and preserving the longitudinal comparisons, each year some items are added or dropped and some word changes take place. Overall this research design has provided the opportunity for nine snapshots of elite opinion taken across the nine presidential elections held in the thirty two years between 1976 and 2008. Outside the University of Michigan Survey Research Center's long term commitment to documenting the characteristics of mass voting behavior and opinion every two years, or every four years since 1952, the Party Elite Study is one of the longest running elite level studies in the discipline.

Examining Factions: American Party Conventions, 1980-2004

The foundation for our present analysis is the extended analysis of the 1988 wave which found that party factions existed and provided for intermediation⁴ (Baer and Dolan 1993). The specific questions analyzed in that study about suggestions for party work were not repeated in later waves. Instead, our goal in the present analysis is to exploit the over-time data to track changes in group representation overtime and their effect on ideology. Our expectations are as follows:

- The two parties will be ideologically distinct in ways that reflect changes in group representation.
- Groups will be pervasive in both parties.
- Each party will exhibit a relatively distinct and stable array of groups.
- Group participation in the parties will vary from convention to convention.

⁴ It should be noted that the analyses in this paper are different than those conducted in the 1993 article for two reasons: the 1993 article combined all party elites including county and state chairs and national committee members; and the 1993 article conducted its analysis using a different set of Likert scale items (only 2 were included in the scale developed for this paper). The findings are, however, similar, which provides further confirmation for the analysis here.

- These groups will differ in ideology and this will be tied to the parties.
- Overtime groups will be “mainstreamed” within the party due to internal processes within each party.

Our first step is to examine whether ideology indeed changes overtime. We calculated a normed ideology score based on 4 issues that were asked across all waves of the Party Elite Study: government aid to minority groups, government provision of services, government responsibility for health insurance, and whether defense spending should be increased or decreased. Each issues was presented to the respondent as a 7-point Likert scale. We recoded these to make 1 consistently the most liberal response (supporting government involvement) and 7 as the most conservative (or *laissez faire*), and added the respondent scores. By dividing by 5, the scale was normed back to the original scale values (i.e., ranging from one to seven) to create a measure of Ideology. Each group was then compared on their average ideology to non-group members, as a whole (here we assume that both conventions together represent a national sample of party elites) and within each party (in order to examine internal party factions). It is important for the reader to be reminded that we are only looking at whether, for example, one is a member of, say, an Evangelical or a Feminist or a Jewish Group – not whether one is of evangelical faith or feminist persuasion or Jewish faith or heritage. The distinction is important because we wish to target factions with parties where organized groups intermediate and comprise organizational centers within parties, not symbolic or demographic representation at the conventions.

Table 3 and **Figure 3** both show the average Ideology score from 1980 to 2004 overall for both parties. As is evident in Figure 3, we can see that polarization overall occurred in two stages at distinct time points in each party. The Democrats become more liberal by 1984, while the Republicans become more conservative by 1996. This is consistent with our expectations. It is interesting that while we hypothesize that the Democrats would have become more liberal beginning in the 1970s, a major shift leftwards occurred in 1984. And while the Republicans began making appeals to cultural conservatives in the 1980s, it was in 1996 that we see a large conservative shift.

Are party elites actives in important political groups? In **Table 4** we calculated the proportion of party elites who are members of at least one type of group, and the average number of groups of which they are a member. There are 15 possible types of groups that were asked in the 1988-2004 waves, with the exception of 2000. As

shown in Table 4, about 9 in 10 party elites across years and party were members of at least one group, with an average of 2.91 to 3.46 groups. These numbers are a bit lower when considered by party, but still more than 8 out of 10 party elites regardless of party are involved in at least one group, and the average number ranges from about 2 and a half to nearly four types of groups. These are significant findings when one considers that we are considering different types of groups rather than a total number of groups (e.g., one can be a member of different business or feminist groups). What is especially interesting is that these numbers increase when we consider the local levels of politics – for those whose party service is primarily local, the trend is for their number of groups to remain the same or increase. This finding suggests that the pervasive nature of group memberships has a grassroots basis.

We next compare the proportion of party elites who claim that they represent a group in their party work. This question was asked in waves from 1984 to 2004. Our findings are shown in **Table 5** and **Figure 4**. Among all party elites, more than a third to over half of party elites feel they represent a group in their party work. It is noteworthy that the proportion representing a group in their party work gradually increased in both parties from 1984 to 2004. Democrats (increasingly from about half to two-thirds of delegates) are more likely than Republicans (from about 2 in 10 to 4 in 10 delegates) to feel they represent a group in their party work – this is consistent with party reform and party culture and coalitional bases.

Our next step was to compare specific categories of groups overtime in terms of their prevalence and their average ideology. This is a complex analysis examining overtime change both in terms of extremity and in terms of the mobilization and partisan orientation. Again, what we are examining are general tendencies in terms of the role of government. This is important because what we seek to measure is not specific issues of concern to “special” interest groups, but how factions also act to polarize party elites more generally in terms of larger vs. smaller government.

Table 6 and **Figures 5-A to 5-O** present the results for prevalence. Table 6 (and the following tables) are organized for readability by groups that tend to be proportionately more Republican, neither more nor less Republican or Democratic, and those that tend to be more Democratic overtime. The Republican groups tend to be Community Service, Business, Veterans, Pro-Life, Farm and Evangelical Groups. Professional Groups (e.g.,

physicians, lawyers) tend to be neither more Democratic or Republican. Groups that tend to be proportionately more Democratic include Civil Rights, Environmental, Non-Partisan (e.g., Common Cause), Feminist, Pro-Choice, Education, Labor and Traditional Women's Organizations. The three group memberships (Jewish, Hispanic, Gay and Lesbian) added to the 1992 wave remain a small proportion of delegates, but are all proportionately more Democratic than Republican.

We also examined the average ideology for all delegates and within each party for members and non-members for 1988, 1992, 1996 and 2004 in **Tables 7-A to 7-D** and in **Figures 6-A to 6-D**. These results concentrate on the 15 groups first included in 1988, but a few analyses also consider a question about 3 groups (Jewish, Hispanic and Gay and Lesbian groups) added to the 1992, 1996 and 2004 waves. Each provides a different look at the data. Tables 7-A to 7-D are organized by the dominant party, while the groups in Figures 6-A to 6-D are organized by the extremity of ideology overall to highlight both party and group effects on ideological extremity. When viewed together, there is a visible party effect overtime. For example, in 1988 (Figure 6-A), the ideology of Republican group members across groups parallels the rise and fall of overall group members when Republicans and Democrats are combined, as does the Democratic Party group members. However, in the figures for later conventions, there is a smoother result – showing increasing polarization over time between the parties.

Overall, there are five basic categories of groups as group representation is considered overtime:

1. **Dominant Groups:** those that are so large as to act as a dominant force with a party – defined here as having an average representation of 40% or greater overtime within a specific party.
2. **Substantial Groups:** those groups whose prevalence has reached a large critical mass – defined here as having an average representation of 16% to 39% overtime within a specific party.
3. **Minor Groups:** those groups who have an identifiable presence, but not large enough to greatly impact party decisions – defined here as an average of 6% to 15% overtime within a specific party.
4. **Trivial Groups:** those groups who may be ideologically distinct within one party, but who are quite small in number proportionately due to either partisan factors, their incomplete mobilization to party elite status, or polarization – defined here as 5% or less of conventions delegates overtime within a specific party.

Our expectations were that we would find a distinctive partisan and group pattern over time. In this regard,

we would expect to find that groups can be within in one of three categories:

1. **The Party Ideological Mainstream:** there are no significant differences in terms of ideology between members and non-members overtime or else any differences tend to be inconsistent
2. **Acting as a Moderating Force:** the group is significantly more liberal (for the Republicans) or significantly more conservative (for the Democrats), and their presence within the party tends to bring the overall party ideology toward the ideological center.
3. **Acting as a Polarizing Force:** the group is more extreme ideologically than non-members even within the party and their presence tends to drive the party toward more polarized positions.

When these two sets of factors are combined, we can label specific factions within a 3x5 table that examines the nature of specific party factions. These results are shown in **Tables 8-A** and **8-B**. Now we turn to individual discussions of each type of group and their partisan effect prior to making overall comparison between Democratic and Republican party patterns.

Community Service Groups. Community Service Groups are a dominant faction within the Republican Party and a substantial faction within the Democratic Party. For Democrats, this is an average of 36.6% across the four conventions' for Republicans, this comparable figure is 43.3%. After similar ideologies in 1988, Community Groups become more polarized in 1992. Overall, community group members differ only slightly from non-members both in 1996 and 2004. Except for 1992, there is no evidence of polarization where the parties become more distinct. Community Service Groups are a moderating force in both parties. Among Democrats, Community Service Group members are significantly more conservative than non-members in 1988, 1992 and 2004. Among Republicans, Community Service Group members are significantly more liberal than non-members in 1988, 1992 and 1996.

Business Groups. Business groups are a dominant faction within the Republican Party (an average of 46.1% across conventions) and a substantial faction (25.6% on average) within the Democratic Party. Ideologically, Business groups are within the ideological mainstream for the Republican Party, but act as a moderating force within the Democratic Party. Among Democrats, Business group members are significantly more conservative than non-members in 1988, 1992 and 2004. For Republicans, Business Group members were significantly more liberal than

non-members only in 1996. As the Republican Party overall has become more conservative, the mean Ideology score for Business group members has gradually increased from 4.89 in 1988, to 5.08 in 1992, to 5.72 in 1996 and a slight decline to 5.57 in 2004. As is evident in Figure 5B, business groups have added to polarization also through their numbers. Business groups have become more prevalent in the Republican Party, but have been reduced as a proportion of Democratic Party. This appears to have begun in 1992 and continued as a trend to 2004.

Veterans Groups. Despite public perceptions based on partisan rhetoric, Veterans Groups are a minor faction that is within the party mainstream for both parties. Veterans Group members comprise an average of 15.4% among Republicans, and an average of 10.4% among Democrats. We find that Veterans Groups have decreased in the Republican Party overtime, while Veterans Groups remain about the same in the Democratic Party. There is a group effect – for all convention years, members of Veterans groups tend to be significantly more conservative than non-members. However, within parties, for most years, Veterans members are not consistently different. Only in 1996 and 2004 were Veterans Group members significantly more conservative than non-members for the Democrats and all mean ideology scores for Republicans across conventions were insignificant.

Pro-Life Groups. Pro-Life Groups are a minor faction within the Democratic Party mainstream, but act as a substantial polarizing group within the Republican Party. They tend to be the most conservative group within the Republican Party, and average 28.6% across all four conventions. Only in 2004 were members of Pro-Life groups significantly more conservative than non-members for Democrats. However, among Republicans, Pro-Life Group members were significantly and markedly more conservative for each of the four conventions, ranging from nearly to substantially more than a half step more conservative. In addition, Pro-Life Groups steadily increase as a proportion of all Delegates, and particularly with the Republican Party. However, Pro-Life Groups remain about the same among Democrats, with an average of 6.4% across conventions and increasing slightly in 2004 to 10.4%. This is a pattern of polarization both in terms of prevalence and ideology.

Farm Groups. While slightly higher among Republicans (an average of 12.6% across conventions), both parties are not sharply differentiated on representation of Farm Groups. Democrats include an average of 6.4% Farm Groups across conventions. Farm groups increase slightly among Republicans in 1996. Members of Farm Groups are minor factions within the party mainstream in both parties. In the 2004 conventions, Farm Group

members were significantly more conservative than non-members in both parties. However, in other years, ideological differences were insignificant in both parties.

Evangelical Groups. Evangelical Group Members comprise a substantial group that acts as a polarizing force within the Republican Party. Among Republicans, Evangelical Group members were significantly more conservative than was true of non-members in each of the four conventions examined here. In contrast, among Democrats, only in 1992 were Evangelical members more conservative than non-members. On average, about 1 in 4 Republican delegates (24.4%) overtime are members of Evangelical Groups. By contrast, Evangelical Group members are a minor group (11.1% across conventions) that is within the party mainstream in the Democratic Party. And while Evangelical Group members have increased slightly among Democratic delegates (15.8% in 2004), Evangelical Group members increased sharply among Republican delegates. The proportion of Evangelical Group members doubled between 1988 and 1992, and then increased by over 50% between 1992 and 1996. There was a slight decrease in 2004 to 27% of Republican delegates, but this still is more than double the proportion in 1988. Some of this difference between the parties is probably due to the different racial demographic of Republican Evangelical members (more white) and Democratic Evangelical members (more African-American). This is a pattern of polarization.

Professional Groups. Professional Group Members are a substantial group within the party mainstreams of both parties. Averaged over the four conventions, they comprise an average of 27.5% among Republican delegates and a similar 27.0% among Democratic delegates. Professional Group Members are equally active in both parties, with a slight decline in both parties in 2004. With the exception of Democrats in 1988 (where Professional Group members were significantly more conservative than non-members), there is no significant difference between Professional Group members and non-members across years and both parties.

Civil Rights Groups. Civil Rights Group members are significantly more liberal than non-members in both parties at each of the four convention years. **Overall**, members of Civil Rights Groups are a substantial, polarizing group within the Democratic Party. In contrast, Civil Rights group members are a minor, moderating group within the Republican Party, averaging 7.6% across all four conventions under examination here. In contrast, Civil Rights members comprise an average of 34.4% across Democratic conventions. In terms of prevalence, Civil Rights

groups declined in both parties in the 1990s until 2004, where they returned to a level similar to that found in 1988.

Environmental Groups. Environmental Groups are a minor, party mainstream group among Republicans, but a substantial polarizing group among Democrats. For Democrats, Environmental Group members comprise 29.7% on average across the four conventions and are significantly more liberal in each of the four conventions. The highest proportion among Democrats was in 1992, when one out of three Democrats was a member of an Environmental Group. In contrast, Environmental Group members are on average only 10.5% among Republican conventions. Environmental groups evidence a gradual decline among the Republicans to a low of 8.8% in 2004. Environmental Group members were classified as a Republican mainstream group since group members were consistently more liberal than non-group members only in 1988 and 2004.

Non-Partisan Groups. Non-Partisan Groups are a substantial, polarizing faction among Democratic delegates, but a minor group within the party mainstream among Republicans. In 1988, 1992 and 1996, Non-Partisan Group members were significantly more liberal than non-members. For Democrats, an average of 23.4% of delegates across conventions is an Environmental Group member. In contrast, only 9.0% of Republican delegates at conventions are Non-Partisan group members. Non-Partisan Groups are a much larger presence in the Democratic Party, but declined gradually in the 1990s and more sharply among Democrats. Among Republicans, ideological differences were insignificant in

Feminist Groups. Feminists are a substantial, polarizing faction within the Democratic Party, averaging 29.6% of delegates in the four conventions. In both parties, Feminist Group members are more liberal than non-members. In contrast, among Republicans, Feminist Group members are a trivial faction whose prevalence averages only 4.2% across the four conventions. Nonetheless, Republican Feminist Group members are significantly more liberal than nonmembers in 1988, 1992 and 1996. Overall, the proportion in the Republican Party is consistently low and declining over time. After a high in 1992, feminists have also declined somewhat in the Democratic Party. The overall pattern is continuing polarization with Feminists almost exclusively found in the Democratic Party .

Pro-Choice Groups. Pro-Choice Group members are more liberal than non-members in both parties. Pro-Choice Groups are a substantial, polarizing faction within the Democratic Party, but a moderating force within the

Republican Party. About one in three Democratic delegates (33.8%) is a member of a Pro-Choice group. In contrast, less than 1 in 10 Republicans are members of Pro-Choice groups (8.6% on average). Thus, among Republicans, Pro-Choice groups comprise a minor group that is more liberal, but lacks critical mass. The patterns overtime are similar, but the pattern is of continuing polarization between the parties.

Education Groups. Education Group members are within the party mainstream of both parties – a substantial group within the Democratic Party, but a minor group within the Republican Party (only 8.6% of delegates on average). The prevalence of Education Group members is higher in the Democratic Party – nearly one in four are members on average (23.8%). 1988 was the most polarized year with Education Group members significantly more liberal than non-members among both Democrats and Republicans. In 2004, neither party exhibited significant differences between members and non-members. In 1992, Education Group members were significantly more liberal only in the Republican Party. In 1996, Education Group members were significantly more liberal in the Democratic Party. Overall, for these four conventions, we found Education Group members to be within the overall party mainstream of their party.

Labor Groups. Labor is a substantial polarizing group within the Democratic Party, and a trivial mainstream group within the Republican Party (only 2.4% on average). For the Democrats, Labor Union Group members were significantly more liberal than non-members in 1988, 1992 and 1996. The proportion of members of Labor Groups in the Democratic Party conventions increases gradually from a low of 21.5% in 1988 to 28.2% to 30.5% in 1996 and 2004 (22.2% on average). And for Democrats (with the exception of 2004). Labor Group members, are significantly more liberal than non-labor members. Both in terms of ideology and prevalence, this is a pattern of increasing polarization. The Republican proportion of Labor Union members is consistently low and ideologically well-encapsulated within the party mainstream, with no significant differences in ideology in any of the four convention years.

Traditional Women's Groups. Among Democrats, traditional Women's Groups are a substantial group (21.7% on average), but one that remains well within the party mainstream ideologically. For Republicans, traditional Women's Group members are also within the party mainstream ideologically, but this faction is a minor group in terms of size (12.1% on average). Overtime prevalence for representation of traditional Women's Groups reveals a

similar pattern with an increase in both parties in 1992 (somewhat larger in the Democratic Party), and a decline thereafter. Except for 2004 in the Republican Party, ideological differences between members of Women's Group members within the two parties are not statistically significant.

Jewish Groups. We only have data for Jewish Group members for 1992, 1996 and 2004. Jewish Groups are a minor, mainstream faction within the Democratic Party. From an ideological perspective, Jewish Group members are a mainstream group within both parties. In terms of prevalence, members of Jewish Group members are a minor group within the Democratic Party and a trivial group within the Republican Party. The representation of Jewish Group members is relatively stable overtime, with an average of 8.23% across conventions for Democrats, and 2.73% among Republicans.

Hispanic Groups. Hispanic Group members are a minor mainstream group for Democrats, and a trivial moderating group for Republicans. For Hispanic Group members, there is a trend of increasing membership in both parties. Among Republicans, there is an average representation of 2.53 across conventions, rising from lows of 1.9% and .9% in 1992 and 1996 to a high of 4.8% in 2004. Among Democrats, there is an average of 6.4% across the 3 conventions and a high of 7.6% in 1996.

Gay and Lesbian Groups. Gay and Lesbian group members comprise a minor, but polarizing faction among Democrats. Gay and Lesbian group members comprise an average of 9.1% of Democrats across the three conventions (1992, 1996 and 2004). Their highest proportion was in 2004 when 10.6% of Democrats were members of Gay and Lesbian Groups. By contrast, Gay and Lesbian group members are rarely found among Republican delegates, comprising only about 1.2% of Republicans overtime. Ideologically, Gays and Lesbians are within the Republican Party mainstream and comprise a trivial group in terms of prevalence.

Democratic and Republican Party Comparisons. Overall, there are some interesting patterns between and within the parties. First, despite party reform and the mobilization of new groups to party activity in both parties, Business and Community groups are still the most prevalent groups in both parties. This should reassure those who find the parties too extreme. Second, we now have evidence of the unitary nature of the Republican Party and the polycentric nature of the Democratic Party. This is a concept widely discussed in the literature and well-articulated using qualitative methods by Jo Freeman (1983). Based on our data, the Republicans have only 3 substantial

groups – and a total of 5 substantial and dominant groups. Democrats are not only characterized by more substantial groups (11), the Democratic Party lacks a dominant group. The Republican Party, by contrast, has two dominant groups – Business and Community Service Groups. And fourth, group patterns within each party revolves around the nature of polarizing and moderating groups – both their extremity and their prevalence. The Republican Party has two growing polarizing factions – Evangelicals and Pro-Life Group members. With the exception of Community Service Groups, moderating factions within the Republican Party are either minor or trivial in size. The Democratic Party has six polarizing factions: Civil Rights, Environmental, Non-Partisan, Feminist, Pro-Choice and Labor Groups – each of which is a substantial group. Moderating groups within the Democratic Party (Business and Community Service Groups) are substantial in size. The nature of these groups provides considerable insight into the unitary nature of the Republican Party and the more polycentric nature of the Democratic Party.

Conclusions

For many political scientists, the key issue dominating the study of political party conventions is “what justification can be made in defense of an institution that...[is]...a combination carnival, Roman circus, and revival meeting? (Davis, 1983:16). Known as “the convention problem,” there are five major critiques: (1) the dangerous “unregulated” nature of parties and conventions, (2) the seeming lack of party responsibility, (3) the lack of qualifications or representativeness of the delegates, (4) whether convention proceedings justify its role as a “deliberative” assembly, and (5) the legal and rational choice critique of parties.

Early critiques at the turn of the twentieth century focused on the “extra-legal” nature of parties. After describing the “camarilla of politicians” and the “incursion of the [ten thousand strong] mob” demanding either “some passion-fed illusion or illusion-fed passion” in the 1904 Democratic Convention where “there were no spectators, all were actors,” one critic argued for statutory control of conventions (Dennis, 1905: 202, 187). Another assessment pointed to problems with “an extra-legal and irresponsible national convention composed of delegates” unfamiliar to voters and “governed by no law, state or national” (Ray, 1923:63). By the mid point of the twentieth century, critiques turned to a gap in a lack of party responsibility, particularly the American Political Science Association 1950 report *Toward A More Responsible Two-Party System*. In this vein, another critic attacked conventions characterized by

"platitudinous demagoguery" rather than "real policy discussions" thereby encouraging "irresponsibility, divided leadership, poor discipline, and undemocratic control. (Pollock 1938, 525, 534).

Ironically, the two parties reformed internally in the 1960s and 1970s to address exactly these issues, but political science critiques of the convention problem continued *albeit* in a different vein. Jeane Kirkpatrick (1976) and Warren Miller and M. Kent Jennings (1986) stressed the development of a "new presidential elite" dominated by extremists and issue activists⁵. Today, American political party conventions are regularly dismissed by scholars and pundits alike as "extravagant television commercials" (Malbin, 2004) and staged "mega media events" (Panagopoulos, 2007: 6) functioning as a "four day testimonial" (Patterson, 2002: 118) for the nominee taking advantage of a "\$100 million dollar loophole" in campaign finance law (Weissman and Hassan, 2004) where "prominent reporters have more influence on the conduct of conventions than do the delegates" who are just extras (Panagopoulos, 2007: 6) Many have concluded that nominating conventions have become increasingly irrelevant in the post-reformed party system because they no longer fulfill the nominating function assigned to them such that "conventions register choices that have already been made" so that "national conventions have become to the nominating process what the Electoral College is to the electing process"⁶ (Ranney, 1984: 359; see also Trent and Friedenber, 2000: 43). These critiques ignore today's "invisible convention"⁷ – open to delegates and guests unlike the smoke-filled room of the brokered convention.

More recent critiques comes from legal and rational choice theorists. Rational choice theorists view leadership incentives as essential, treating party organizations as primarily formed to support the electoral needs of officeholders (Schlesinger, 1991) and serving as tools through which party leaders can discipline candidates to

⁵ For comparative scholars, this is May's (1973) Law of Curvilinear Disparity. Kirkpatrick (1976) also attacked the delegates as dominated by "symbol" and "information" specialists (i.e., those with higher levels of education).

⁶ Even allowing license for the use of a metaphor, the "Electoral College" was *never* intended to be a deliberative body since electors who are designated by state legislatures assemble in their own state capitols -- they do not meet or deliberate as a national body.

⁷ Byron Shafer (1988) calls this the "bifurcated convention" but argues that the internal activities are of interest only to party elites. The alternative concept of the "invisible" convention is discussed in an unpublished paper by Denise Baer entitled "The Dangers of the Drunkard's Search for Political Party Theory: Developing a Party Organizational Framework for Studying Party Meetings" that is available upon request from the author.

encourage them to “stand down” (Caillaud and Tirole, 2002). These approaches, based upon a theoretical fiction of rationality, emphasize legal frameworks rather than institutional incentives deriving from culture, values and informal processes (Green and Shapiro, 1994; Friedman, 1996; Czada, 1998; Walker, 1983; Strom, 1990). From this perspective, change is primarily a matter of altered rules or changing numbers (e.g., the size of the majority party in legislative arenas (Binder 1997; Dion 1997)). These theorists question whether parties can provide democracy (e.g., Stokes who wonders whether political parties are an “inextricable weed” in the garden of democracy (1999:263-64)) and see little harm from regulating parties. One idea is to regulate party selection under the rule of “one man, one vote” (University of Chicago Law Review, 1970). For example, Issacharoff and Pildes (1998) argue that political markets should be regulated to avoid “political lockups.” Embedded within this approach is an implicit normative posture based upon a theoretically assumed “state of nature” where collective action does not exist.

Understanding the contemporary adaptation of the nominating convention requires placing the convention in the context of American political development, which we have sought to do. We started this paper with a review of models of party and made the case that a party-centric model provides a better theoretical starting point for understanding changes in political parties. We then examined the concept of factions and argued that the contemporary era is marked by the advent of true, intermediary factions. We did not seek to provide direct evidence of intermediation (this has been done in an earlier article (Baer and Dolan 1993). Our data analysis was designed to examine whether there is evidence overtime among contemporary delegates to support these theoretical arguments. While we do not expect that our findings will prove persuasive regarding the paradigm debates, but the overall results of our findings do provide strong evidence concerning the embedded nature and role of groups at conventions – a set of facts that must be accounted for regardless of one’s theoretical orientation.

First, this has significant implications for how polarization is defined for both rational choice theory and critics of red state-blue state polarization. In terms of rational choice theoretical approaches who cast increasing polarization as derived from dealignment among the mass public, our finding that there are statistically significant ideological differences overtime among networked party elites is important because we now know that leaders themselves are committed to differing views both within and between the parties. In terms of Morris Fiorina’s argument that only elites have become polarized, our analysis demonstrates that there are indeed strong patterns of

group memberships that are as or more likely at the state and local levels of party service (Fiorina 2002).

We also believe that our study demonstrates the importance of studying parties directly rather than indirectly through voter or legislative studies. At a time when political parties are viewed as increasingly central for democracy (Carothers, 1999, 2006), academic attention to political parties overall has declined. In a review of research on European parties, Carmani and Hug find that the volume of studies peaked in the 1970s and significantly dropped since then. This literature also reflects academic fashions. For example, of the more than 11,500 books, articles, and monographs on political parties and party systems in Europe published between 1945 and 1994, more than half of the studies of party families focuses on parties of the left, and only 4% are truly comparative (i.e., including three or more countries). Of greater importance to the questions at hand, only about one in ten focused on party organizations (Carmani and Hug, 1998:501, 502, 507).

While changes in party ideologies - what they stand for – may resist “generalizable causal analysis” (Geering 2001:21), a study of party organizational change can provide insights into how this process occurs. If conventions are indeed as important for intermediation as we claim, then this suggests that what delegates do at the conventions and how this links to the extended campaign season and the delegate selection processes as well as party coalitions should undergo further examination using mixed methods – both the quantitative methods employed here as well as qualitative research at the conventions themselves.

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TABLE 1
FACTIONAL DISPUTES OVER NOMINATIONS AT NATIONAL NOMINATING CONVENTIONS, 1832-2008
BY PARTY ORGANIZATIONAL ERA AND TYPE OF FACTIONAL COMPETITION

TYPE OF FACTIONAL NOMINATION	DOMINANT PARTY ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL							TOTALS
	Cadre Party 1832-1848	Rudimentary Organizations 1848-1856	Interregnum 1857-1865	Machine Party 1865-1913	State Utility Parties 1914-1960	Transitional Era 1960-1972	Institutionalized National Parties 1974 - present	
Dominant Factional Ascendency		66.7% of the nominations						
Renominations	2	0	1	9	10	3	6	54.4% (31)
Nomination of Heir Apparent	3	0	0	1	2	2	5	23.2% (13)
Inner-Group Coalition	2	1	1	5	2	0	1	21.4% (12)
Subtotals	78 % (7)	25 % (1)	50 % (2)	62.5 % (15)	63.5 % (14)	62.5 % (5)	66.7 % (12)	100% (56)
High Factional Competition		33.3% of the nominations						
Compromise in Factional Stalemate	1	1	1	4	4	0	0	33.3% (11)
Insurgent Factional Victory	1	2	1	5	4	3	6	66.7% (22)
Subtotals	22 % (2)	75 % (3)	50 % (2)	37.5 % (9)	36.4 % (8)	37.5 % (3)	33.3 % (6)	100% (331)
TOTAL Nominations by Party Era	9	4	4	24	22	8	18	89

The method of classifying nominations was taken from David, Paul T. and Ralph M. Goldman (1955) 'Presidential Nominating Patterns', *Western Political Quarterly* 8: 465-480. David and Goldman ended their analysis in 1952. More recent nominees were classified as either **Dominant Factional Ascendency** (Stevenson 1956; Eisenhower 1956; Nixon 1960; Johnson 1964; Humphrey 1968; Nixon 1968; Nixon 1972; Ford 1976; Carter 1980; Mondale 1984; Reagan 1984; Bush41 1988 and 1992; Clinton 1996; Dole 1996; Gore 2000; Bush43 2000 and 2004) or **High Factional Competition** (Kennedy 1960; Goldwater 1964; McGovern 1972; Reagan 1980; Dukakis 1988; Clinton 1992; Obama 2008; McCain 2008).

TABLE 2
FACTIONAL DISPUTES OVER NOMINATIONS
AT NATIONAL NOMINATING CONVENTIONS, 1832-2008
BY PARTY ORGANIZATIONAL ERA,
POLITICAL PARTY AND TYPE OF FACTIONAL COMPETITION

DOMINANT PARTY ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL	TYPE OF FACTIONAL CONFLICT			
	Dominant Factional Ascendancy		High Factional Competition	
	Democratic Party	Republican Party (Until 1860, parties were Whig and National Republican)	Democratic Party	Republican Party (Until 1860, parties were Whig and National Republican)
Cadre Party 1832-1848	80%	80%	20%	20%
Rudimentary Organizations 1848-1856	0%	50%	50%	50%
Interregnum 1857-1865	50%	50%	50%	50%
Machine Party 1865-1913	67%	58.3%	33%	41.7%
State Utility Parties 1914-1960	63.6%	63.6%	36.4%	36.4%
Transitional Era 1960-1972	50%	75%	50%	25%
Institutionalized National Parties 1974 - present	55.6%	77.8%	44.4%	22.2%

The method of classifying nominations was taken from David, Paul T. and Ralph M. Goldman (1955) 'Presidential Nominating Patterns', *Western Political Quarterly* 8: 465-480. David and Goldman ended their analysis in 1952. More recent nominees were classified as either **Dominant Factional Ascendancy** (Stevenson 1956; Eisenhower 1956; Nixon 1960; Johnson 1964; Humphrey 1968; Nixon 1968; Nixon 1972; Ford 1976; Carter 1980; Mondale 1984; Reagan 1984; Bush41 1988 and 1992; Clinton 1996; Dole 1996; Gore 2000; Bush43 2000 and 2004) or **High Factional Competition** (Kennedy 1960; Goldwater 1964; McGovern 1972; Reagan 1980; Dukakis 1988; Clinton 1992; Obama 2008; McCain 2008).

TABLE 3														
Average Ideology Over Time by Party														
1=Extreme Liberal 7=Extreme Conservative														
	2004		2000		1996		1992		1988		1984		1980	
	D	R	D	R	D	R	D	R	D	R	D	R	D	R
\bar{x}=	2.62	5.50	2.89	5.59	2.78	5.80	2.57	5.10	2.79	4.94	2.78	4.92	3.74	4.81
n=	423	476	455	410	507	431	472	355	250	203	458	549	487	489
t=	t=43.30		t=40.93		t=47.22		t=36.13		t=21.27		t=36.09		t=22.68	
p(t)=	.000		.000		.000		.000		.000		.000		.000	

The Ideology score ranges from 1 (most liberal) to 7 (most conservative). It was computed by adding respondent score to standard 7 point Likert scales items on Government Services (continue same level vs cut), Health Insurance (government provide vs. private insurance), Aid to Minorities (government provide vs. each on their own), and Defense Spending (increase vs. cut). This scale ranged from 4 to 28 and was then normed by dividing by the number of items (4) to place the scale back into the original Likert format, ranging from 1 to 7.

TABLE 4
Number and Average Group Memberships by Party, Level of Party Service and Year, 1988-2004

Year	Group Activity	ALL Delegates	Democratic Convention Delegates			Republican Convention Delegates				
			ALL	By Self-Identified Level of Party Activity		ALL	By Self-Identified Level of Party Activity			
				National	State		Local	National	State	Local
2004	% Belonging to at Least One Group	86.7% [N=1000]	88.1% [N=500]	100.0% [N=2]	89.9% [N=283]	86.0% [N=200]	85.4% [N=500]	82.1% [N=83]	83.3% [N=204]	89.3% [N=197]
	Average Number of Groups	$\bar{x} = 3.20$	$\bar{x} = 3.67$	$\bar{x} = 1.50$	$\bar{x} = 3.86$	$\bar{x} = 3.46$	$\bar{x} = 2.72$	$\bar{x} = 2.71$	$\bar{x} = 2.59$	$\bar{x} = 2.85$
2000		[This bank of questions was omitted in the 2000 Wave of the Party Elite Study]								
1996	% Belonging to at Least One Group	90.4% [N=976]	92.2% [N=525]	87.7% [N=73]	91.5% [N=188]	93.9% [N=261]	88.2% [N=451]	83.6% [N=55]	87.1% [N=201]	90.4% [N=188]
	Average Number of Groups	$\bar{x} = 2.91$	$\bar{x} = 3.20$	$\bar{x} = 2.73$	$\bar{x} = 3.17$	$\bar{x} = 3.35$	$\bar{x} = 2.58$	$\bar{x} = 2.53$	$\bar{x} = 2.48$	$\bar{x} = 2.66$
1992	% Belonging to at Least One Group	87.8% [N=875]	90.5% [N=505]	88.0% [N=109]	96.6% [N=148]	93.2% [N=219]	84.1% [N=370]	80.3% [N=61]	88.7% [N=149]	80.5% [N=149]
	Average Number of Groups	$\bar{x} = 3.46$	$\bar{x} = 3.93$	$\bar{x} = 2.77$	$\bar{x} = 4.19$	$\bar{x} = 4.25$	$\bar{x} = 2.82$	$\bar{x} = 2.92$	$\bar{x} = 3.05$	$\bar{x} = 2.57$
1988	% Belonging to at Least One Group	89.4% [N=472]	94.6% [N=260]	97.0% [N=67]	96.2% [N=78]	93.2% [N=103]	83.0% [N=212]	90.2% [N=51]	81.2% [N=85]	73.9% [N=68]
	Average Number of Groups	$\bar{x} = 3.02$	$\bar{x} = 3.51$	$\bar{x} = 3.70$	$\bar{x} = 3.35$	$\bar{x} = 3.57$	$\bar{x} = 2.42$	$\bar{x} = 2.51$	$\bar{x} = 2.38$	$\bar{x} = 2.40$

TABLE 5						
Percent of Delegates Who Self-Identify Themselves as Representing a Group in Their Party Work						
Delegate Group	Convention Year					
	1984	1988	1992	1996	2000	2004
ALL	34.5 %	45.2%	40.9%	45.8%	42.2%	54.1%
	[N=1021]	[N= 462]	[N=842]	[N=962]	[N=881]	[N=935]
Democrats Only	49.8%	58.5%	51.7%	60.8%	58.7%	68.6%
	[N= 466]	[N=253]	[N=482]	[N=521]	[N=463]	[N=472]
Republicans Only	21.6%	29.2%	26.4%	28.1%	23.8%	39.2%
	[N=555]	[N=209]	[N=360]	[N=441]	[N=419]	[N=463]

TABLE 6
Percent Within Each Delegate Population Who Are Members
of Specified Types of Groups Overtime, 1988-2004

GROUP	2004		2000	1996		1992		1988		
	D%	R%		D%	R%	D%	R%	D%	R%	
<i>Groups That are Proportionately More REPUBLICAN</i>										
Community	33.8	39.2	This bank of questions asked this wave.	35.6	41.5	35.2%	48.1%	41.9%	44.5%	
	p(x2)=.08			p(x2)=.06		p(x2) 000		NS		
Business	22.6	47.0		24.6	45.9	23.6	48.9	31.5	42.7	
	p(x2)=.00			p(x2)=.000		p(x2)=.000		p(x2)=.013		
Veterans	10.2	12.0		10.5	15.1	9.1	15.7	11.9	19.0	
	p(x2)=.000			p(x2)=.000		p(x2).003		p(x2)=.034		
Pro-Life	10.4	37.4		5.1	31.3	5.3	24.1	5.0%	21.8	
	p(x2)=.000			p(x2)=.000		p(x2)=.000		p(x2)=.000		
Farm	8.0	16.0		6.7	15.1	4.8	7.0	6.2%	12.3	
	P=.000			P=000		NS		p(x2)=.000		
Evangelical	15.8	27.0		13.0	36.6	11.5	23.0	4.2	10.9	
	p(x2)=.000			p(x2)=.000		p(x2)=.000		p(x2)=.000		
<i>Groups That Are NEITHER</i>										
Professional	22.2	20.0								
		NS								
<i>Groups That Are</i>										
Civil Rights	38.0	9.6								
	p(x2)=.000									
Environment	30.2	8.8								
	p(x2)=.000									
Non-Partisan	22.0	9.2								
	p(x2)=.000									
Feminist	27.2	3.0								
	p(x2)=.000									
Pro-Choice	32.4	7.2								
	p(x2)=.000									
Education	22.0	9.0								
	p(x2)=.000									
Labor	28.2	3.8								
	p(x2)=.000									
Women	18.0	12.0								
	p(x2)=.008									
Jewish	7.4	4.2								
	p(x2)=.03									
Hispanic	7.4	4.8								
	p(x2)=.086									
Gay and Lesbian	10.6	1.6								
	p(x2)=.000									
<i>Proportionately More REPUBLICAN or DEMOCRATIC</i>										
	27.4	29.3	28.5	32.7%	30.0	28.0				
		NS		NS		NS				
<i>Proportionately More DEMOCRATIC</i>										
	28.8	3.8	33.1	10.5	37.7	6.6				
	p(x2)=.000		p(x2)=.000		p(x2)=.000					
	24.0	8.9	36.0	11.1	28.5	12.8				
	p(x2)=.000		p(x2)=.000		p(x2)=.000					
	17.7	6.9	25.3	10.3	28.5	9.5				
	p(x2)=.000		p(x2)=.000		p(x2)=.000					
	25.1	2.7	35.0%	4.1	31.2	7.1				
	p(x2)=.000		p(x2)=.000		p(x2)=.000					
	30.9	7.1	41.2	12.4	30.8	7.6				
	p(x2)=.000		p(x2)=.000		p(x2)=.000					
	25.9	7.5	24.6	11.4	22.7	6.6				
	p(x2)=.000		p(x2)=.000		p(x2)=.000					
	30.7	1.1	28.5	2.2	21.5	2.4				
	p(x2)=.000		p(x2)=.000		p(x2)=.000					
	21.7	9.1	27.9	15.4	19.2	11.8				
	p(x2)=.000		p(x2)=.000		p(x2)=.029					
	7.4	1.3	9.9	2.7	These groups were not included in 1988 wave.					
	p(x2)=.000		p(x2)=.000							
	7.6	.9	4.2	1.9						
	p(x2)=.000		p(x2)=.000							
	8.2	.9	8.5	1.1						
	p(x2)=.000		p(x2)=.000							

<p align="center">TABLE 7-A 1988 DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN CONVENTIONS Average Issue Ideology of Group Members and Non-Members by Party</p>						
<p>88 GROUP % by Party</p>	ALL PARTY ELITES		DEMOCRATS Only		REPUBLICANS Only	
	<p align="center">Mean Ideology 1=Extremely Liberal 7=Extremely Conservative</p>					
	ALL MEMBERS	ALL NON-Members	Democratic MEMBERS	Democratic NON-Members	Republican MEMBERS	Republican NON-Members
<i>Groups That are Proportionately More REPUBLICAN</i>						
<p>Community D%=41.9% R%=44.5% NS</p>	3.87 [N=198]	3.66 [N=255]	3.06 [N=105]	2.60 [N=145]	4.80 [N=93]	5.05 [N=110]
	NS		t=3.31	p(t)=.001	t=-1.80	p(t)=.073
<p>Business D%=31.5% R%=42.7% p(χ²)=.013</p>	4.05 [N=165]	3.58 [N=288]	3.13 [N=78]	2.64 [N=172]	4.89 [N=87]	4.97 [N=116]
	t=3.26 p(t)=.001		t=3.32	p(t)=.001	NS	
<p>Veterans D%=11.9% R%=19.0% p(χ²)=.034</p>	4.12 [N=69]	3.69 [N=384]	3.00 [N=29]	2.76 [N=221]	4.92 [N=40]	4.94 [N=163]
	t=2.18 p(t)=.030		NS		NS	
<p>Pro-Life D%=5.0% R%=21.8% p(χ²)=.000</p>	4.97 [N=58]	3.57 [N=395]	3.00 [N=13]	2.78 [N=237]	5.53 [N=45]	4.77 [N=158]
	t=6.89 p(t)=.000		NS		t=4.65	p(t)=.000
<p>Farm D%=6.2% R%=12.3% p(χ²)=.019</p>	4.17 [N=41]	3.71 [N=412]	3.19 [N=16]	2.76 [N=234]	4.80 [N=25]	4.95 [N=178]
	t=1.87 p(t)=.063		NS		NS	
<p>Evangelical D%=4.2% R%=10.9% p(χ²)=.005</p>	4.68 [N=34]	3.68 [N=419]	2.55 [N=11]	2.80 [N=239]	5.70 [N=23]	4.84 [N=180]
	t=3.77 p(t)=.000		NS		t=3.91	p(t)=.000
<i>Groups That are NEITHER Proportionately More Republican or Democratic</i>						
<p>Professional D%=30.0% R%=28.0% NS</p>	3.89 [N=129]	3.70 [N=324]	3.11 [N=73]	2.66 [N=177]	4.91 [N=58]	4.95 [N=147]
	NS		t=2.97	p(t)=.003	NS	

88 GROUP % by Party	ALL MEMBERS	ALL NON-Members	Democratic MEMBERS	Democratic NON-Members	Republican MEMBERS	Republican NON-Members
Groups That are Proportionately More DEMOCRATIC						
Civil Rights D%=37.7% R%=6.6% p(χ ²)=.000	2.58 [N=107]	4.12 [N=346]	2.35 [N=93]	3.05 [N=157]	4.00 [N=14]	5.00 [N=189]
	t=10.30 p(t)=.000		t=5.07 p(t)=.000		t=3.65 p(t)=.000	
Environment D%=28.5% R%=12.8% p(χ ²)=.000	3.12 [N=95]	3.92 [N=358]	2.59 [N=69]	2.87 [N=181]	4.50 [N=26]	5.00 [N=177]
	t=4.74 p(t)=.000		t=1.76 p(t)=.079		t=2.35 p(t)=.020	
Non-Partisan D%=28.5% R%=9.5% p(χ ²)=.000	2.92 [N=91]	3.96 [N=362]	2.53 [N=72]	2.90 [N=178]	4.42 [N=19]	4.99 [N=184]
	t=6.10 p(t)=.000		t=2.44 p(t)=.015		t=2.32 p(t)=.021	
Feminist D%=31.2% R%=7.1% p(χ ²)=.000	2.67 [N=91]	4.02 [N=362]	2.43 [N=77]	2.95 [N=173]	4.00 [N=14]	5.01 [N=189]
	t=8.20 p(t)=.000		t=3.57 p(t)=.000		t=3.65 p(t)=.000	
Pro-Choice D%=30.8% R=7.6% p(χ ²)=.000	2.77 [N=92]	4.00 [N=361]	2.47 [N=76]	2.93 [N=174]	4.19 [N=16]	5.00 [N=187]
	t=7.39 p(t)=.000		t=3.08 p(t)=.002		t=3.11 p(t)=.002	
Education D%=22.7% R%=6.6% p(χ ²)=.000	2.79 [N=73]	3.94 [N=380]	2.44 [N=59]	2.90 [N=191]	4.29 [N=14]	4.98 [N=189]
	t=7.24 p(t)=.000		t=2.85 p(t)=.005		t=2.49 p(t)=.014	
Labor D%=21.5% R%=2.4% p(χ ²)=.000	2.46 [N=61]	3.95 [N=392]	2.27 [N=56]	2.94 [N=194]	4.60 [N=5]	4.94 [N=198]
	t=7.65 p(t)=.000		t=4.18 P(t)=.000		NS	
Women D%=19.2% R%=11.8% p(χ ²)=.029	3.41 [N=71]	3.82 [N=382]	2.79 [N=47]	2.79 [N=203]	4.62 [N=24]	4.98 [N=179]
	t=2.10 p(t)=.036		NS		NS	
<p>The Ideology score ranges from 1 (most liberal) to 7 (most conservative). It was computed by adding respondent score on standard 7 point Likert scale items on Government Services (continue same level vs cut), Health Insurance (government provide vs. private insurance), Aid to Minorities (government provide vs. each on their own), and Defense Spending (increase vs. cut). This scale ranged from 4 to 28 and was then normed by dividing by the number of items (4) to place the scale back into the original Likert format, with a range of 1 to 7.</p>						

TABLE 7-B 1992 DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN CONVENTIONS Average Issue Ideology of Group Members and Non-Members by Party						
92 GROUP % by Party	ALL PARTY ELITES		DEMOCRATS Only		REPUBLICANS Only	
	Mean Ideology 1=Extremely Liberal 7=Extremely Conservative					
	ALL MEMBERS	ALL NON-Members	Democratic MEMBERS	Democratic NON-Members	Republican MEMBERS	Republican NON-Members
<i>Groups That are Proportionately More REPUBLICAN</i>						
Community D%=35.2% R%=48.1% p(x2)=.000	3.90 [N=336]	3.49 [N=491]	2.75 [N=164]	2.47 [N=145]	5.00 [N=172]	5.20 [N=179]
	t=3.72 p(t)=.000		t=2.96 p(t)=.003		t=-1.90 p(t)=.058	
Business D%=23.6% R%=48.9% p(x2)=.000	4.18 [N=285]	3.38 [N=542]	2.77 [N=111]	2.50 [N=361]	5.08 [N=174]	5.13 [N=181]
	t=6.99 p(t)=.000		t=2.43 p(t)=.015		NS	
Veterans D%=9.1% R%=15.7% p(x2)=.003	4.07 [N=97]	3.60 [N=730]	2.67 [N=43]	2.55 [N=429]	5.19 [N=54]	5.09 [N=301]
	t=2.73 p(t)=.006		NS		NS	
Pro-Life D%=5.3% R%=24.1% p(x2)=.000	4.99 [N=109]	3.45 [N=717]	2.83 [N=24]	2.55 [N=448]	5.60 [N=85]	4.95 [N=269]
	t=9.86 p(t)=.000		NS		t=5.42 p(t)=.000	
Farm D%=4.8% R%=7.0% NS	4.09 [N=46]	3.63 [N=781]	2.52 [N=21]	2.57 [N=451]	5.40 [N=25]	5.08 [N=330]
	t=1.88 p(t)=.06		NS		NS	
Evangelical D%=11.5% R%=23.0% p(x2)=.000	4.44 [N=138]	3.50 [N=689]	2.83 [N=54]	2.53 [N=418]	5.48 [N=84]	4.99 [N=271]
	t=6.46 p(t)=.000		t=2.10 p(t)=.036		t=3.96 p(t)=.000	
<i>Groups That are NEITHER Proportionately More Republican or Democratic</i>						
Professional D%=28.5% R%=32.7% NS	3.79 [N=260]	3.59 [N=567]	2.61 [N=140]	2.55 [N=332]	5.12 [N=120]	5.07 [N=235]
	NS		NS		NS	

92 GROUP % by Party	ALL MEMBERS	ALL NON-Members	Democratic MEMBERS	Democratic NON-Members	Republican MEMBERS	Republican NON-Members
Groups That are Proportionately More DEMOCRATIC						
Civil Rights D%=33.1% R%=10.5% p(χ ²)=.000	2.65 [N=193]	3.96 [N=634]	2.26 [N=155]	2.72 [N=317]	4.26 [N=38]	5.20 [N=317]
	t=11.90 p(t)=.000		t=4.80 p(t)=.000		t=5.70 p(t)=.000	
Environment D%=36.6% R%=11.1% p(χ ²)=.000	2.91 [N=214]	3.92 [N=613]	2.42 [N=173]	2.65 [N=299]	4.95 [N=41]	5.12 [N=314]
	t=8.76 p(t)=.000		t=2.40 p(t)=.017		NS	
Non-Partisan D%=25.3% R%=10.3% p(χ ²)=.000	3.02 [N=161]	3.81 [N=666]	2.40 [N=123]	2.62 [N=349]	5.03 [N=38]	5.11 [N=317]
	t=5.71 p(t)=.000		t=2.17 p(t)=.030		NS	
Feminist D%=35.0% R%=4.1% p(χ ²)=.000	2.54 [N=181]	3.97 [N=646]	2.38 [N=168]	2.67 [N=304]	4.54 [N=13]	5.13 [N=342]
	t=13.84 p(t)=.000		t=3.02 p(t)=.003		t=2.08 p(t)=.038	
Pro-Choice D%=41.2% R%=12.4% p(χ ²)=.000	2.80 [N=243]	4.01 [N=584]	2.33 [N=198]	2.74 [N=274]	4.89 [N=45]	5.14 [N=310]
	t=11.09 p(t)=.000		t=4.49 p(t)=.000		NS	
Education D%=24.6% R%=11.4% p(χ ²)=.000	3.08 [N=157]	3.79 [N=670]	2.51 [N=116]	2.58 [N=356]	4.71 [N=41]	5.16 [N=314]
	t=5.54 p(t)=.000		NS		t=2.71 p(t)=.007	
Labor D%=28.5% R%=2.2% p(χ ²)=.000	2.51 [N=141]	3.89 [N=686]	2.37 [N=133]	2.64 [N=339]	5.00 [N=8]	5.11 [N=347]
	t=11.92 p(t)=.000		t=2.71 P(t)=.007		NS	
Women D%=27.9% R%=15.4% p(χ ²)=.000	3.24 [N=191]	3.78 [N=636]	2.49 [N=137]	2.60 [N=335]	5.15 [N=54]	5.10 [N=301]
	t=4.11 p(t)=.000		NS		NS	
<p>The Ideology score ranges from 1 (most liberal) to 7 (most conservative). It was computed by adding respondent score on standard 7 point Likert scale items on Government Services (continue same level vs cut), Health Insurance (government provide vs. private insurance), Aid to Minorities (government provide vs. each on their own), and Defense Spending (increase vs. cut). This scale ranged from 4 to 28 and was then normed by dividing by the number of items (4) to place the scale back into the original Likert format, with a range of 1 to 7.</p>						

TABLE 7-C 1996 DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN CONVENTIONS Average Issue Ideology of Group Members and Non-Members by Party						
96 GROUP % by Party	ALL PARTY ELITES		DEMOCRATS Only		REPUBLICANS Only	
	Mean Ideology 1=Extremely Liberal 7=Extremely Conservative					
	ALL MEMBERS	ALL NON-Members	Democratic MEMBERS	Democratic NON-Members	Republican MEMBERS	Republican NON-Members
<i>Groups That are Proportionately More REPUBLICAN</i>						
Community D%=35.6% R%=41.5% p(χ ²)=.06	4.24 [N=360]	4.12 [N=578]	2.82 [N=182]	2.75 [N=325]	5.69 [N=178]	5.88 [N= 178]
	NS		NS		t=-2.17 p(t)=.03	
Business D%=24.6% R%=45.9% p(χ ²)=.000	4.62 [N=321]	3.93 [N=617]	2.88 [N=124]	2.74 [N=383]	5.72 [N=197]	5.87 [N=234]
	t=5.68 p(t)=.000		NS		t=1.75 p(t)=.08	
Veterans D%=10.5% R%=15.1% p(χ ²)=.03	4.62 [N=117]	4.10 [N=821]	3.06 [N=52]	2.74 [N=455]	5.86 [N=65]	5.79 [N=366]
	t=2.91 p(t)=.004		t=3.21 p(t)=.04		NS	
Pro-Life D%=5.1% R%=31.3% p(χ ²)=.000	5.63 [N=162]	3.86 [N=776]	2.89 [N=27]	2.77 [N=480]	6.18 [N=135]	5.63 [N=296]
	t=13.45 p(t)=.000		NS		t=6.21 p(t)=.000	
Farm D%=6.7% R%=15.1% p(χ ²)=.000	4.85 [N=98]	4.09 [N=840]	2.94 [N=33]	2.76 [N=474]	5.82 [N=65]	5.80 [N=366]
	t=4.32 p(t)=.000		NS		NS	
Evangelical D%=13.0% R%=36.6% p(χ ²)=.000	5.11 [N=224]	3.87 [N=714]	2.77 [N=64]	2.78 [N=443]	6.05 [N=160]	5.65 [N=271]
	t=9.45 p(t)=.000		NS		t=4.39 p(t)=.000	
<i>Groups That are NEITHER Proportionately More Republican or Democratic</i>						
Professional D%=27.4% R%=29.3% NS	4.15 [N=263]	4.17 [N=675]	2.80 [N=140]	2.77 [N=367]	5.69 [N=123]	5.84 [N=308]
	NS		NS		NS	

96 GROUP % by Party	ALL MEMBERS	ALL NON-Members	Democratic MEMBERS	Democratic NON-Members	Republican MEMBERS	Republican NON-Members
Groups That are Proportionately More DEMOCRATIC						
Civil Rights D%=28.8% R%=3.8% p(χ ²)=.000	2.65 [N=160]	4.48 [N=778]	2.41 [N=145]	2.92 [N=362]	4.93 [N=15]	5.83 [N=416]
	t=15.52 p(t)=.000		t=5.18 p(t)=.000		t=3.75 p(t)=.000	
Environment D%=24.0% R%=8.9% p(χ ²)=.000	3.23 [N=163]	4.36 [N=775]	2.50 [N=124]	2.86 [N=383]	5.54 [N=39]	5.83 [N=392]
	t=8.12 p(t)=.000		t=2.49 p(t)=.001		NS	
Non-Partisan D%=17.7% R%=6.9% p(χ ²)=.000	3.31 [N=121]	4.29 [N=817]	2.40 [N=90]	2.86 [N=417]	5.97 [N=31]	5.79 [N=400]
	t=5.67 p(t)=.000		t=3.90 p(t)=.000		NS	
Feminist D%=25.1% R%=2.7% p(χ ²)=.000	2.73 [N=138]	4.41 [N=800]	2.53 [N=127]	2.86 [N=380]	4.91 [N=11]	5.82 [N=420]
	t=14.75 p(t)=.000		t=3.08 p(t)=.002		t=3.27 p(t)=.001	
Pro-Choice D%=30.9% R%=7.1% p(χ ²)=.000	2.95 [N=190]	4.47 [N=748]	2.51 [N=159]	2.90 [N=348]	5.23 [N=31]	5.84 [N=400]
	t=13.06 p(t)=.000		t=4.02 p(t)=.000		t=3.64 p(t)=.000	
Education D%=25.9% R%=7.5% p(χ ²)=.000	3.28 [N=163]	4.35 [N=775]	2.58 [N=129]	2.84 [N=378]	5.91 [N=34]	5.79 [N=397]
	t=7.47 p(t)=.000		t=2.51 p(t)=.012		NS	
Labor D%=30.7% R%=1.1% p(χ ²)=.000	2.65 [N=161]	4.48 [N=777]	2.55 [N=156]	2.87 [N=351]	5.60 [N=5]	5.80 [N=426]
	t=17.20 p(t)=.000		t=3.33 P(t)=.001		NS	
Women D%=21.7% R%=9.1% p(χ ²)=.029	3.49 [N=148]	4.29 [N=790]	2.75 [N=110]	2.78 [N=397]	5.63 [N=38]	5.82 [N=393]
	t=5.49 p(t)=.000		NS		NS	
<p>The Ideology score ranges from 1 (most liberal) to 7 (most conservative). It was computed by adding respondent score on standard 7 point Likert scale items on Government Services (continue same level vs cut), Health Insurance (government provide vs. private insurance), Aid to Minorities (government provide vs. each on their own), and Defense Spending (increase vs. cut). This scale ranged from 4 to 28 and was then normed by dividing by the number of items (4) to place the scale back into the original Likert format, with a range of 1 to 7.</p>						

TABLE 7-D 2004 DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN CONVENTIONS Average Issue Ideology of Group Members and Non-Members by Party						
04 GROUP % by Party	ALL PARTY ELITES		DEMOCRATS Only		REPUBLICANS Only	
	Mean Ideology 1=Extremely Liberal 7=Extremely Conservative					
	ALL MEMBERS	ALL NON-Members	Democratic MEMBERS	Democratic NON-Members	Republican MEMBERS	Republican NON-Members
<i>Groups That are Proportionately More REPUBLICAN</i>						
Community D%=33.8% R%=39.2% p(χ ²)=.08	4.34 [N=332]	4.04 [N=566]	2.86 [N=144]	2.50 [N=279]	5.47 [N=188]	5.53 [N= 287]
	t=2.54 p(t)=.01		t=3.54 p(t)=.000		NS	
Business D%=22.6% R%=47.0% p(χ ²)=.000	4.78 [N=327]	3.79 [N=571]	2.94 [N=99]	2.53 [N=324]	5.57 [N=228]	5.44 [N=247]
	t=8.63 p(t)=.000		t=3.60 p(t)=.000		NS	
Veterans D%=10.2% R%=12.0% NS	4.43 [N=102]	4.11 [N=797]	3.07 [N=45]	2.57 [N=337]	5.52 [N=56]	5.50 [N=419]
	t=1.72 p(t)=.08		t=3.21 p(t)=.001		NS	
Pro-Life D%=10.4% R%=37.4% p(χ ²)=.000	5.22 [N=227]	3.78 [N=671]	3.11 [N=44]	2.57 [N=378]	5.74 [N=182]	5.36 [N=2.93]
	t=12.32 p(t)=.000		t=2.78 p(t)=.008		t=4.20 p(t)=.000	
Farm D%=8.2% R%=16.0% p(χ ²)=.000	4.86 [N=109]	4.05 [N=789]	2.98 [N=34]	2.59 [N=388]	5.70 [N=75]	5.47 [N=400]
	t=4.57 p(t)=.000		t=2.19 p(t)=.03		t=1.94 p(t)=.05	
Evangelical D%=15.8 R%=27.0% p(χ ²)=.000	4.69 [N=201]	3.99 [N=697]	2.68 [N=68]	2.61 [N=354]	5.72 [N=133]	5.42 [N=343]
	t=5.01 p(t)=.000		NS		t=3.04 p(t)=.002	
<i>Groups That are NEITHER Proportionately More Republican or Democratic</i>						
Professional D%=20.0% R%=22.2% NS	3.19 [N=190]	4.14 [N=708]	2.68 [N=68]	2.61 [N=354]	5.46 [N=97]	5.51 [N=379]
	NS		NS		NS	

04 GROUP % by Party	ALL MEMBERS	ALL NON-Members	Democratic MEMBERS	Democratic NON-Members	Republican MEMBERS	Republican NON-Members
Groups That are Proportionately More DEMOCRATIC						
Civil Rights D%=38.0% R%=9.6% p(χ ²)=.000	3.06 [N=224]	4.51 [N=674]	2.51 [N=176]	2.71 [N=246]	5.08 [N=48]	5.55 [N=428]
	t=12.00 p(t)=.000		t=1.99 p(t)=.05		t=3.17 p(t)=.002	
Environment D%=30.2% R%=8.8% p(χ ²)=.000	3.17 [N=170]	4.38 [N=728]	2.45 [N=127]	2.70 [N=295]	5.32 [N=43]	5.52 [N=433]
	t=8.90 p(t)=.000		t=2.39 p(t)=.02		NS	
Non-Partisan D%=22.0% R%=9.2% p(χ ²)=.000	3.47 [N=142]	4.28 [N=756]	2.50 [N=97]	2.65 [N=326]	5.56 [N=46]	5.50 [N=430]
	t=5.10 p(t)=.000		NS		NS	
Feminist D%=27.2% R%=3.0% p(χ ²)=.000	2.77 [N=139]	4.40 [N=760]	2.48 [N=124]	2.69 [N=299]	5.38 [N=10]	5.51 [N=461]
	t=12.51 p(t)=.000		t=2.04 p(t)=.04		NS	
Pro-Choice D%=32.4% R%=7.2% p(χ ²)=.000	2.94 [N=177]	4.44 [N=721]	2.43 [N=143]	2.72 [N=280]	5.07 [N=35]	5.54 [N=441]
	t=12.10 p(t)=.000		t=2.83 p(t)=.005		t=2.68 p(t)=.008	
Education D%=20.0% R%=9.0% p(χ ²)=.000	3.48 [N=144]	4.28 [N=754]	2.61 [N=99]	2.63 [N=323]	5.37 [N=45]	5.52 [N=430]
	t=5.27 p(t)=.000		NS		NS	
Labor D%=21.5% R%=2.4% p(χ ²)=.000	2.99 [N=151]	4.38 [N=747]	2.65 [N=132]	2.61 [N=290]	5.41 [N=19]	5.51 [N=457]
	t=10.60 p(t)=.000		NS		NS	
Women D%=18.0% R%=12.0% p(χ ²)=.008	3.77 [N=139]	4.22 [N=759]	2.72 [N=82]	2.60 [N=340]	5.29 [N=57]	5.53 [N=419]
	t=2.74 p(t)=.006		NS		t=1.7 p(t)=.08	
<p>The Ideology score ranges from 1 (most liberal) to 7 (most conservative). It was computed by adding respondent score on standard 7 point Likert scale items on Government Services (continue same level vs cut), Health Insurance (government provide vs. private insurance), Aid to Minorities (government provide vs. each on their own), and Defense Spending (increase vs. cut). This scale ranged from 4 to 28 and was then nomed by dividing by the number of items (4) to place the scale back into the original Likert format, with a range of 1 to 7.</p>						

**TABLE 8-A
 IDEOLOGICAL TRENDS AMONG
 DEMOCRATIC PARTY FACTIONAL GROUPS**

Average Size of the Group, 1988-2004	Ideological Impact of Group Members		
	MODERATING <i>Direction of the Ideological Difference is Toward the Center (3 or 4 out of Four Conventions, 1988-2004)</i>	PARTY MAINSTREAM <i>Ideological Differences are Non-Significant or else the Directional Difference is Split</i>	POLARIZING <i>Direction of the Ideological Differences is Toward the Ideological Extreme Position</i>
Dominant <i>40% or larger % of the Delegates</i>			
Substantial <i>16% to 39%</i>	Community Groups Business	Professional Education Women	Civil Rights Environment Non-Partisan Feminist Pro-Choice Labor
Minor <i>6% to 15%</i>		Veterans Pro-Life Farm Evangelical Jewish** Hispanic**	Gay and Lesbian**
Trivial <i>5% or Less</i>			

****We only have data for members of Jewish, Hispanic, or Gay and Lesbian groups for 1992, 1996, and 2004 conventions. For these groups, the ideological direction was determined by the direction for 2 out of 3 conventions.**

**TABLE 8-B
IDEOLOGICAL TRENDS AMONG
REPUBLICAN PARTY FACTIONAL GROUPS**

Average Size of the Group, 1988-2004	Ideological Impact of Group Members		
	MODERATING <i>Direction of the Ideological Difference is Toward the Center (3 or 4 out of Four conventions, 1988-2004)</i>	PARTY MAINSTREAM <i>Ideological Differences are Non-Significant or else the Directional Difference is Split</i>	POLARIZING <i>Direction of the Ideological Differences is Toward the Ideological Extreme Position</i>
Dominant <i>40% or larger % of the Delegates</i>	Community	Business	
Substantial <i>16% to 39%</i>		Professional	Pro-Life Evangelical
Minor <i>6% to 15%</i>	Civil Rights Pro-Choice	Veterans Farm Environmental Non-Partisan Education Women	
Trivial <i>5% or Less</i>	Feminist Hispanic**	Labor Jewish** Gay and Lesbian**	
**We only have data for members of Jewish, Hispanic, or Gay and Lesbian groups for 1992, 1996, and 2004 conventions. For these groups, the ideological direction was determined by the direction for 2 out of 3 conventions.			

FIGURE 1: Timeline of Party Development Frameworks

1789...1804.....1824.....1844.....1864.....1884.....19041924.....1944.....1964.....1984.....2004....

Political Development of Party Organizations

Caucus Factions 1794-1824	Cadre Party Organization 1824-1848	Rudi- men- tary	Inter- reg- num	Machine Party 1865-1913	State Utility Party 1914-1960	Transition Era	Institutionalized Party Organization 1974-????
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Party Realignments and Party System Change

Pre-Party Factions	DEMOCRATS v. Whigs 1828-1860	REPUBLICANS v. Democrats 1860-1896	REPUBLICANS v. Democrats 1896-1932	DEMOCRATS v. Republicans 1932-????	<i>Dealignment ? Realignment ? Issue Evolution?</i>
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
Methods of Presidential Nominations

Caucus Dominant 1789-1824	Convention Dominant 1832-1904	Convention + Boutique Primary 1904-1968	Primary Dom. 1968-1988	Frontloaded Primary 1988-2008
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Development of Congressional Power Centers

Congress Met as a Whole 1789-1809	Development of Permanent Congressional Committees 1810-1865	Committee Expansion 1866-1918	Committee Consolidation 1919-1946	Committee Baron Era 1947-69	Cong. Reorg. 1969-80	Partisan Instit. Conflict 1980-????
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Significant Events In Party Government







FIGURE 4: SELF-IDENTIFIED GROUP REPRESENTATION
Proportion of Convention Delegates Representing a Group in Their Party Work by Year and Party, 1984-2004




FIGURE 5A: COMMUNITY SERVICE GROUP MEMBERSHIPS
Proportion of Convention Delegates Who Are Members of Community Service Groups By Year and Party, 1988-2004




FIGURE 5B: BUSINESS GROUP MEMBERSHIPS
Proportion of Convention Delegates Who Are Members of Business Groups By Year and Party, 1988-2004




FIGURE 5C: VETERANS GROUP MEMBERSHIPS
Proportion of Convention Delegates Who Are Members of Veterans Groups By Year and Party, 1988-2004




FIGURE 5D: PRO-LIFE GROUP MEMBERSHIPS
Proportion of Convention Delegates Who Are Members of Pro-Life Groups By Year and Party, 1988-2004




FIGURE 5E: FARM GROUP MEMBERSHIPS
Proportion of Convention Delegates Who Are Members of Farm Groups By Year and Party, 1988-2004




FIGURE 5F: EVANGELICAL GROUP MEMBERSHIPS
Proportion of Convention Delegates Who Are Members
of Evangelical Groups By Year and Party, 1988-2004




FIGURE 5G: PROFESSIONAL GROUP MEMBERSHIPS
Proportion of Convention Delegates Who Are Members
of Professional Groups By Year and Party, 1988-2004




FIGURE 5H: CIVIL RIGHTS GROUPS
Proportion of Convention Delegates Who Are Members of Civil Rights Groups By Year and Party, 1988-2004




FIGURE 5I: ENVIRONMENTAL GROUP MEMBERSHIPS
Proportion of Convention Delegates Who Are Members of Environmental Groups By Year and Party, 1988-2004




FIGURE 5J: NON-PARTISAN GROUP MEMBERSHIPS
Proportion of Convention Delegates Who Are Members
of Non-Partisan Groups By Year and Party, 1988-2004




FIGURE 5K: FEMINIST GROUP MEMBERSHIPS
Proportion of Convention Delegates Who Are Members
of Feminist Groups By Year and Party, 1988-2004




FIGURE 5L: PRO-CHOICE GROUP MEMBERSHIPS
Proportion of Convention Delegates Who Are Members
of Pro-Choice Groups By Year and Party, 1988-2004




FIGURE 5M: EDUCATION GROUP MEMBERSHIPS
Proportion of Convention Delegates Who Are Members
of Education Groups By Year and Party, 1988-2004




FIGURE 5N: LABOR GROUP MEMBERSHIPS
Proportion of Convention Delegates Who Are Members
of Evangelical Groups By Year and Party, 1988-2004




FIGURE 5O: WOMENS GROUP MEMBERSHIPS
Proportion of Convention Delegates Who Are Members
of Women's Groups By Year and Party, 1988-2004

